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Abstract
This article presents an analysis of different approaches to terrorist violence, with a particular focus
on suicide terrorism, using the above mentioned levels of analysis as a conceptual framework to
organize this study. In doing so, the article focuses primarily on four selected studies: Khashan's
theory of collective Palestinian frustration operating at individual and structural levels; Pape's
strategic theory of suicide terrorism, Devji's notion of global jihad, and Hammes' conceptualization of
suicide terrorism as one of the strategies of Fourth Generation Warfare, all studied at a strategic level.
Drawing on these analyses, as well as on Tilly, this article attempts to address the question of whether
suicide terrorism represents a "coherent phenomenon," and whether there is, or may be, a generalized
pattern which could account for all possible causes of martyrdom operations.
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Conceptualizing Terrorist Violence 
and Suicide Bombing
By Murad Ismayilov
Introduction
Though suicide terrorism has long been a focus of the world community's 
political agenda, there remains an intense debate between different 
approaches to explaining this social phenomenon. Tracking the logic of 
suicide terrorism, one should distinguish between motivation for a politi-
cal decision to launch a martyrdom campaign (strategic level of analysis) 
and factors motivating individuals to serve as suicide bombers (individual 
and structural levels of analysis).
Attempts by social scientists to explain martyrdom operations may be 
classified into two alternative groups: rational choice theories and irratio-
nal models. While the former, operating mainly at a strategic level, view 
terrorist violence as inherently rational action perpetrated by purposeful 
agents, the latter, normally operating at an individual level of martyrs or a 
structural level of a broader society in which those martyrs are embedded, 
ascribe it to psychological and/or social causes (e.g. fanaticism).1 
This article presents an analysis of different approaches to terrorist 
violence, with a particular focus on suicide terrorism, using the above 
mentioned levels of analysis as a conceptual framework to organize this 
study. In doing so, the article focuses primarily on four selected studies: 
Khashan's theory of collective Palestinian frustration operating at 
individual and structural levels;2 Pape's strategic theory of suicide 
terrorism,3 Devji's notion of global jihad,4 and Hammes' 
conceptualization of suicide terrorism as one of the strategies of Fourth 
Generation Warfare,5 all studied at a strategic level. Drawing on these 
analyses, as well as on Tilly,6 this article attempts to address the question 
of whether suicide terrorism represents a "coherent phenomenon," and 
whether there is, or may be, a generalized pattern which could account for 
all possible causes of martyrdom operations.
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Individual vs. Structural Levels of Analysis: Terrorist 
Violence as an Irrational Act
Most scholars studying suicide terrorism from the perspective of an indi-
vidual attacker have focused on, and emphasized, the irrationality of the 
suicide act. In doing so, they have attributed the latter to psychological 
(individual) or broader social (structural) causes. For example, one of the 
possible explanations of the alleged normalcy with which Palestinians 
(and others) commit a suicide act can be described as "sheer repetition."7 
Indeed, it would be difficult to argue against the fact that the continuous 
sense of fear that the Palestinians observe and go through, both in their 
daily lives and in media coverage, has long transformed—for most of 
them—an act of laying down one's life in the name of a bigger struggle into 
normalized behavior. The latter concept lends credibility to Kelley's 
notion of a "learning process" that legitimizes suicide bombings among 
Palestinians, or Juergensmeyer's notion of a "Palestinian culture of vio-
lence."8 Khashan also emphasizes a collective "suicidal mentality" as a 
structural factor driving Palestinian suicide bombings, as opposed to indi-
vidual predispositions to martyrdom operations.9 Given the relatively 
small number of Palestinian suicide attacks from 1993 (when the first 
such an attack took place) onwards, however, a "culture of martyrdom" 
can barely serve as a single causal factor explaining the Palestinian drive 
for suicide terrorism.
Other factors, structural and individual, to which the inclination to 
endorse, and to participate in, martyrdom operations is normally attrib-
uted include religious indoctrination and fanaticism, poverty, youth, psy-
chological predispositions, and lack of education.
Religious Fanaticism
Religious fanaticism is perhaps the most commonly-invoked socio-
psychological factor by which Western observers try to explain the 
martyrdom phenomenon. Those who favor this argument usually refer to 
different Muslim traditions and the Quran itself as promising the martyr 
(shahid) and his family numerous rewards in the world beyond.10 Many 
also tend to view the Shia concept of self-sacrifice in pursuit of justice as 
an explanatory factor in this context.11
Others, however, who analyze the role of Islam in political violence, insist 
that it has nothing to do with religion. Rather, this group of scholars 
ascribes violence to Islam's political agenda of establishing an Islamic 
state.12 This latter perspective on the nexus between Islam and political 
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violence brings us from an individual/structural level of analysis to the 
strategic one, and creates a rational explanatory framework for collective 
efforts of suicide bombers, while ignoring the multitude of their individ-
ual motivations.
On the other hand, Pape rightly mentions that suicide terrorism is not 
confined to Islamic fundamentalism. The suicide activities of Tamil Tigers 
in Sri Lanka, long proponents of suicide terrorism and adherents of an 
atheistic Marxist/Leninist ideology, are a bright manifestation of this 
phenomenon.13 Even the members of so-called Islamic fundamentalist 
organizations, such as al-Qaida, are now argued to be void of adherence to 
any specific Islamic tradition, with many of those coming from a rather 
secular education.14
While Islamic fanaticism and other psychological and socioeconomic 
variables do have certain explanatory power, none of these is either neces-
sary or sufficient for a suicide bombing to occur. Hilal Khashan's empiri-
cal study on Palestinian refugees in South Lebanon—one in which the 
author attempts to find general environmental or circumstantial patterns 
that would help explain Palestinians' support for and proneness to perpe-
trate suicide bombings—lays bare how some of the factors may come into 
play in one set of circumstances, and be rather irrelevant in a different 
context.15 
For his part, Khashan, on the one hand, suggests that the refugees' 
endorsement of and personal participation in suicide bombings are deter-
mined by youth, strong commitment to political Islam, and severe social 
and economic conditions (education and income). On the other hand, he 
concludes that gender and what he terms social functionality (the combi-
nation of self-esteem, social trust, optimism, sanctity of life, and personal 
competence) are irrelevant in terms of explaining the refugees' support 
for suicide bombings. Drawing on his research project—one confined to 
only a limited number of people and a limited geographic area, namely, 
342 Palestinian refugees (a single category of potential martyrs) from 
South Lebanon—Khashan argues that there is a discernible pattern one 
could descry in the suicide bombing phenomena. Khashan's findings, 
however, suggest a different, more compelling conclusion.16 Even within 
the limited context in which the study took place, no common causal pat-
tern could be discerned. As Khashan's study unveils, the willingness of the 
camp refugees to carry out suicide operations is mainly a function of polit-
ical Islam, while among urban refugees it is income—not Islam—that 
explains proneness to commit a suicide attack (which, in turn, the author 
explains by referring to the relative deprivation theory).17
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Khashan's findings, hence, reveal several variations in causal factors, even 
in a bounded political/spatial context, such as in the case study on South 
Lebanon. This, in turn, renders it ever more difficult to come up with any 
common pattern to account for all possible causes of martyrdom 
operations.18
Strategic Level of Analysis: Terrorist Violence as a 
Rational Act
Scholars who follow rational choice theory argue that terrorism should be 
understood as a strategy adhered to toward achieving certain aims. For 
example, in his article "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists," Charles Tilly con-
tends that "terror is a [political] strategy, not a creed," and, as such, repre-
sents "asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies 
using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely 
operating within some current regime."19 The terrorist strategy, accord-
ing to Tilly, has "a crude logic of its own," insofar as it sends "signals that 
the target is vulnerable, that the perpetrators exist, and that the perpetra-
tors have the capacity to strike again." These signals are typically 
addressed to three different audiences: "the targets themselves, potential 
allies of the perpetrators, and third parties that might cooperate with one 
or the other." Importantly, terrorist violence, Tilly argues, is normally not 
an end in itself, but rather is perpetrated in support of at least four 
demands: recognition, redress, autonomy, or transfers of power. Hence, 
for Tilly, terror is a strategy aimed at altering or inhibiting the target's dis-
approved behavior, fortifying the perpetrators' standing with potential 
allies, and moving third parties toward greater cooperation with the per-
petrators' organization and announced program.20 
The U.S. State Department's definition of terrorism—"politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an 
audience"21—also implies intentionality, and hence rationality, behind 
terrorist violence.
Different studies that discuss the possibility of a single, coherent explana-
tion for the logic of martyrdom operations, or jihad in general, have 
devised arguments that fit in the generic framework that Tilly suggested 
for terrorist violence as a strategy. Euben, for example, argues that jihad, 
as it is invoked and practiced today by the Islamist "fundamentalists," is a 
form of political action which links the perpetrators' moral objective, that 
is pursuit of immortality and salvation, with the political endeavor of "the 
founding or recreation" of a single Muslim political community, that is a 
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legitimate umma, to exist "beyond a single lifetime." This link between 
immortality and politics "makes political action not merely instrumen-
tally but existentially significant."22 Khashan, on the other hand, brings 
together pursuit of immortality and the desire "to achieve a balance of ter-
ror with Israel's overwhelming military machine" in his attempt to explain 
the strategic intentions of suicide bombers.23
Drawing upon numerous interviews conducted in the West Bank, Lori 
Allen reveals that Palestinians view suicide attacks as a political aim that 
is "striking back at the Israeli occupation." She stresses that Palestinians 
view targeting Israeli civilians as "the only way to make Israelis notice 
what their government is doing" and, thereby, place pressure on their 
Prime Minister to leave the Occupied Territories.24 This paradigm makes 
explicit the rationality that guides some Palestinians who endorse martyr-
dom operations.
One of the most comprehensive system-level theories of suicide terrorism 
has been developed by Robert Pape who, based on his study of the uni-
verse of suicide terrorist attacks worldwide from 1980 to 2001 (in sum, 
188), argues that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic.25 Echoing 
Tilly, Pape insists that, notwithstanding irrationality and fanaticism of 
many individual suicide attackers:
"viewed from the perspective of the terrorist organization, suicide 
attacks are designed to achieve specific political purposes: to 
coerce a target government to change policy, to mobilize addi-
tional recruits and financial support, or both."26
In bringing the individual and strategic levels of analysis together, Pape 
suggests that suicide terrorism may be regarded as an extreme form of 
what theorist Thomas Schelling called "the rationality of irrationality…in 
which an act that is irrational for individual attackers is meant to demon-
strate credibility to a democratic audience that still more and greater 
attacks are sure to come."27
Though a viable theory in its own right, Pape's argument suffers from a 
major flaw, which is in his insistence that the strategic logic of suicide ter-
rorism lies in pursuit of specific territorial goals (like the withdrawal of 
the target state's military forces from what the terrorists would see as a 
national homeland), an assertion harshly debated by some other scholars 
as applied to the case of al-Qaida's jihad.
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Jihad and Suicide Terrorism
An alternative view to Pape is provided by Faisal Devji, who, echoing 
Oliver Roy,28 argues that national liberation struggles (what he calls 
"local struggles"), as well as hard and disturbed economic and social con-
ditions, are not the main causes of al-Qaida's global jihad.29 Rather, while 
viewing the localized struggles as mere stereotypes, he sees the main 
cause of jihad as a de-territorialized anti-imperialist struggle toward 
achieving a caliphate. For Devji, jihad subordinates local struggles to a 
global objective, in that struggles in particular states are only important 
instrumentally so long as they serve to promote the metaphysical goals of 
Islam as global entity.
The rationality of terrorist violence is supported by the view that al-
Qaida's endorsement of suicide terrorism pioneered a new form of net-
worked militancy and, as such, represents one of the strategies of the 
Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). This view has been adopted by Colo-
nel Thomas Hammes, an American expert in counterinsurgency war-
fare.30 A strategic logic of the suicide terrorism within this framework is 
clear insofar as the 4GW, in Hammes' definition, "uses all available net-
works—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy's 
political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable 
or too costly for the perceived benefit"31—a definition again echoing 
Tilly's framework for terrorism in general.32 Thus, Hammes views al-
Qaida as "a model for a 4GW networked, transnational enemy," which 
manifests itself, among other things, in its active use of media as a means 
to communicate its ideas and beliefs worldwide, its reluctance to claim 
responsibility for its terrorist attacks, and its being a highly networked 
organization.33
Hammes' view is also shared by the U.S. State Department which views 
al-Qaida as having "many characteristics of a 'globalized insurgency,'" 
which employs a number of strategies (among which are subversion, sab-
otage, open warfare), terrorist violence being only one of them.34
Toward a Viable Coherent Theory
The variety of approaches, both at individual and structural levels of anal-
ysis on the one hand and a strategic level on the other, beg for a question 
on whether a single coherent theory can account for all cases of suicide 
terrorism.
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In the first wave of explanations of suicide terrorism, which focused on 
individual characteristics and predispositions of the suicide bombers, 
Pape suggested that "there may not be a single profile" common to all 
suicide bombers.35 Indeed, there may be a range of profiles from 
religiously-indoctrinated, uneducated, unemployed, poor, socially-
isolated, single men to secular, well-educated, employed, rich, married 
and socially well-integrated men or women; a fact that renders any 
proactive policy planning rather impotent. As Pape rightly notes, 
"although only a tiny number of people become suicide terrorists, they 
come from a broad cross section of lifestyles, and it may be impossible to 
pick them out in advance."36 Khashan's study also nicely demonstrates 
that different factors come into play in different contexts.37
On the other hand, Tilly questions the feasibility of even developing a 
theory of terrorist violence, let alone suicide terrorism, at the strategic 
level, arguing that, because of a "remarkable array of actors [that] 
sometimes adopt terror as a strategy…no coherent set of cause-effect 
propositions can explain terrorism as a whole."38 Tilly goes on to state 
that "terrorism is not a single coherent phenomenon," insofar as 
"terrorists range across a wide spectrum of organizations, circumstances, 
and beliefs."39 The terrorist strategy may be employed, according to Tilly, 
by at least four types of actors (militias, conspirators, autonomists, and 
zealots), which Tilly distinguishes along the criteria of whether they are 
violent specialists or not, and whether they deploy terror within their own 
operating territories or direct it elsewhere.40 Because these four actors 
are engaged in four varieties of politics against at least four varieties of 
victims, there is, Tilly concludes, no way to theorize terrorism as "a single 
causally coherent phenomenon."41
Further complicating the issue is the fact that there is no agreement as to 
a single approach even when it comes to a single "type" of terror, such as 
suicide terrorism; a problem exposed by the theories developed by Pape, 
Devji, and Hammes. While each of those theories captures a certain 
aspect of this complex social phenomenon, none is able to account for all 
cases; nor is any even capable of covering all aspects within individual 
cases.
Importantly, the political implication is that each of these approaches 
suggests a different, sometimes even contradictory, set of strategies to 
counterterrorism. Thus, while socio-economic models beg for generic 
measures aimed at improving conditions in the global South, Hammes 
suggests that the United States, in its efforts to effectively counter global 
jihad, should adjust its military machine to fighting Fourth Generation 
Warfare; an effort that would require a cultural and organizational shift to 
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an interagency approach, greater focus on people than on technology, 
careful analysis of each individual threat, and greater flexibility.42 
In contrast to Hammes' offensive military action strategy, Pape suggests 
defensive measures as the best way to counter international terrorism, 
and recommends that states facing suicide terrorism "should invest sig-
nificant resources in border defenses and other means of homeland secu-
rity" thereby reducing "terrorists' confidence in their ability to carry out 
such attacks on the target society."43
Devji, in turn, views non-territorial jihad as an exclusively internal con-
flict for the United States—one between the state's responsibility to pro-
vide for individual liberties of all of its citizens on the one hand and the 
urge to provide for their security on the other—and as such "existing 
beyond America's war-making potential." This being so, the only way for 
the United States to address the threat of jihad, Devji concludes, is "by 
attacking itself," that is by "subverting the constitutional provisions of its 
own civil liberties and impeding the demographic, financial and techno-
logical mobility that provide the foundations of its own economic might;" 
a move that would make the United States a "suicide state, its martyrdom 
mirroring the many martyrdoms of the jihad."44
Conclusion
Ultimately, current research is inadequate to support a single coherent 
theory capable of accounting for all possible cases of suicide terrorism. 
Both theories trying to explain individual motivation for suicide terrorism 
and those that seek to analyze the rationale behind a political decision to 
launch a martyrdom campaign are necessary but not sufficient for under-
standing a social phenomenon as complex as suicide terrorism. While 
theories operating at individual and structural levels of analysis stop short 
of explaining why suicide attacks cease when the agenda of political lead-
ership shifts away from martyrdom operations, strategic approaches 
alone cannot explain, or account for, individual motivations to contribute 
to those operations. The implication is that the development of a single 
set of policy measures to ward off the threat of martyrdom operations 
becomes simply impossible. The solution, for now, calls for a multi-
dimensional and individual approach in dealing with this social phenom-
enon exclusively on a case-by-case basis.
Conceptually, the debate between structural and individual levels of anal-
ysis, on which different attempts to explain individual motivations for sui-
cide terrorism reside, mirrors a broader structure-agency debate 
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currently under way in international relations theory. And like the latter's 
tentative conclusions suggest, the relationship between the two levels is 
not unidirectional but rather mutually constitutive with one level inform-
ing, and simultaneously being informed by, the other in many interesting 
ways. The mechanism through which this mutual constitution occurs is 
context specific; the reality to which every case of terrorism in general, 
and suicide terrorism in particular, owes its sense of uniqueness, and the 
phenomenon which should be analyzed and deconstructed for every indi-
vidual case before any attempt at countering terrorism (in a particular 
context) is pursued.
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